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the sufficiency of the memorandum, there is neither logic nor




EQUITABLE DEVIATION IN INDIANA
The will of William E. English directed that certain
real property on Monument Circle in Indianapolis be placed
in charitable trust, and that the trustees erect a new building
thereon to serve as headquarters for charities of the city.
Sale of the property was expressly forbidden by the will.
The trustees, however, petitioned the Marion County Probate
Court for an order authorizing sale of the land. It was shown
that the existing structure had become too antiquated to be
used for the trust purpose; that an insufficiency in trust
assets-the result of changed conditions-had rendered im-
practicable the erection of a new building; and that sale of
the property would provide funds with which a building could
be erected elsewhere, thereby fulfilling the purpose of the
trust. These facts moved the court to apply the doctrine
of equitable deviation and order sale of the land. On appeal
the order was affirmed. Foust v. William E. English Founda-
tion, 80 N. E.2d 303 (Ind. App. 1948).
This decision, the first in Indiana to sanction the sale
of trust property despite the settlor's express prohibition,
was apparently' decided on the basis of equitable deviation,
21. The trend among the later cases seems to be toward the rule
that delivery is not required. Tennessee, Virginia, and Pennsylvania
have within the last quarter century subscribed to this view. Black v.
Black, 185 Tenn. 23, 202 S. W.2d 659 (1947); Radiophone Broadcasting
Station v. Imboden, 183 Tenn. 215, 191 S. W.2d 535 (1946); Boston v.
De Jarnette, 153 Va. 591, 151 S. E. 146 (1930); Chiles v. Bowyer, 127
Va. 249, 103 S. E. 619 (1920); Peoples Trust Co. v. Consumers Ice &
Coal Co., 283 Pa. 76, 128 Atl. 723 (1925); Allen v. Mowry, 278 Pa.
64, 122 Ati. 168 (1923).
1. The Appellate Court's grounds of decision are obscure. In the
Marion County Probate Court the parties had argued the applicability
of an Indiana statute which empowers circuit or superior courts to
authorize sales of trust property if one of the following is shown: the
trust real property is subject to waste or depreciation; taxes and costs
of repair exceed the income of the property; the sale of the property
would be advantageous to the beneficiaries and fulfill the trust pur-
poses. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Repl. 1943) § 56-621. The decree of
the Marion County Probate Court evidently was based not on the
statute, but upon the court's "equitable powers in the administration
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1 RECENT CASES
a doctrine new to the jurisprudence of this state. That doc-
trine is frequently confused2 with another equitable doctrine,
cy pres, by which courts under somewhat similar circum-
stances justify departure from directions contained in trust
instruments. Examination of the differences between the
two doctrines is relevant in considering the central problem
of what circumstances must be shown to justify equitable
deviation.
Cy pres, applicable only to charitable trusts, is properly
used to direct a trust's purpose to an end different from that
specified by the settlor. To invoke cy pres it must appear
that the settlor has manifested a general charitable intent
within the scope of which are comprehended both the speci-
fied purpose and the purpose to which the trust is to be
changed. Cy pres permits this substitution of purpose where
it has become "impossible, illegal, or impracticable" to carry
out the original purpose designated by the settlor.3 On the
other hand, equitable deviation, which applies alike to chari-
of the trust to carry out the . . . purposes expressed therein." See
Brief for Appellants, pp. 100-101. Appellants (heirs and others who
asserted interests in the trust property) in their appellate brief argued
that the statute applied only to circuit or superior courts and hence
could not be invoked by the Marion County Probate Court. Brief for
Appellants, p. 125. Appellee (trustee of the trust) contended the
wording was not conclusive since the Marion County Probate Court
was established after passage of the statute and furthermore that court
was given concurrent jurisdiction in all actions by and against trus-
tees. See IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Repl. 1946) § 4-2910.
The opinion of the Appellate Court, while making no comment on
this issue, by citing the statute may have concurred with appellee's
view. Presumably, however, its decision rested on the same doctrine
of equitable deviation to which the trial court referred. The ambiguity
arises because the Appellate Court cited four authorities as exemplify-
ing "the rule" adopted: 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 381 (1939); 2 RESTATEMENT,
TRUSTS §" 381 (1935) ; 14 C. J. S., Charities § 50 (1939) ; and the Indi-
ana statute referred to above. Perhaps the court considered the statute
to be a legislative restatement of the inherent equity power to apply the
doctrine of equitable deviation.
2. Confusion of the doctrines of equitable deviation and cy pres
is apparent in the authorities which treat cy pres as a method by
which a change in administrative machinery may be effected. See, e.g.,
Tincher v. Arnold, 147 Fed. 665, 673 (7th Cir. 1906); Reasoner v.
Herman, 191 Ind. 642, 652, 134 N. E. 276, 280 (1922); Richards v.
Wilson, 185 Ind. 335, 393, 112 N. E. 780, 798 (1916); Bradway,
Tendencies in the Application of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 5 TEMP. L. Q.
489 (1931) passim; Kohn, The Doctrine of Cy Pres in England and
Anerica, 21 CASE AND COMMENT 628, 635 (1915). Both doctrines de-
rive from inherent equity power and are not dependent on statutory
authorization.
3. See Quinn, v. People's Trust, 223 Ind. 317, 328, 60 N. E.2d 281,
285 (1945); 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 431-41 (1935); 3 ScoTT,
TRUSTS § 399.2 (1939); RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 399 (1935).
19491
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
table and private trusts, is used to accomplish changes in
the administration of the trust.4 Unlike the situation in cy
pres, the originally designated purpose of the trust is not al-
tered. Where the settlor has prohibited the alienation of trust
property, a court will authorize a change in the administra-
tion of the trust by applying equitable deviation if certain ele-
ments are shown to be present.5
First, inasmuch as it is the retention provision that is to
be changed, it must appear that the directed retention was an
expression by the settlor of the manner, method, or plan
of administration by which his intent or purposes were to be
accomplished. Obviously there is frequently a problem of
differentiating those retention clauses expressive of trust
purposes from those which embody administrative directions.,
This suggests that a petitioner seeking authorization for the
sale of property held in a charitable trust may wisely argue
that the retention provision, if not an administrative direc-
tion, is declaratory of a trust purpose and therefore subject
to alteration under cy pres.7
Secondly, the court must be shown that subsequent to
the creation of the trust, a change of conditions occurred
4. See Scott, Deviation fro-m the Terms of a Trust, 44 HARv. L.
REV. 1025 (1931).
5. 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 394; 3 id. §§ 561, 562; 2
ScoTT, TRUSTS § 167, 190.4; 3 id. § 381; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS §§ 167,
190, 381. See Note, 168 A. L. R. 1018 (1947), collecting cases which
concern sale of trust property.
6. Retention provisions were treated as administrative directions,
and the doctrine of equitable deviation was, therefore, correctly applied
in the disposition of the following cases: Voris v. Sloan, 68 Ill. 588(1873) ; Johnson v. Wagner, 219 N. C. 235, 13 S. E.2d 419 (1941);
Grace Church v. Ange, 131 N. C. 314, 77 S. E. 239 (1913); Matter of
Pulitzer, 139 Misc. 575, 249 N. Y. S. 87 (1931), aff'd mem., 237 App.
Div. 808, 260 N. Y. S. 975 (1932); Craft v. Shroyer, 81 Ohio. App.
253, 74 N. E.2d 589 (1947); Town of South Kingston v. Wakefield
Trust, 48 R. I. 27, 134 At. 815 (1926); Henshaw v. Flenniken, 183
Tenn. 232, 191 S. W.2d 541 (1945); Will of Stack, 217 Wis. 94, 258
N. W. 324 (1935). In the following cases changes respecting retention
of trust property were effected by application of the doctrine of cy
pres. The inference is, therefore, that retention of the property was
a trust purpose. See Shoemaker v. American Security & Trust, 163
F.2d 585, (App. D. C. 1947). In fact however, courts, while applying
the doctrine of cy pres, may characterize the retention provisions as
administrative directions. See Village of Hinsdale v. Chicago City
Missionary Soc., 375 Ill. 220, 30 N. E.2d 657 (1940) ; Norris v. Loomis,
215 Mass. 344, 102 N. E. 419 (1913); Ely v. Attorney General, 202
Mass. 545, 89 N. E. 166 (1909); Weeks v. Hobson, 150 Mass. 377, 23
N. E. 215 (1890); In re Y. W. C. A., 96 N. J. Eq. 568, 126 Atl. 610(1924).
7. Appellee in the principal case argued both doctrines. Brief
for Appellee, pp. 34, 41.
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which would bring about the "defeat or substantial impair-
ment" of the trust purpose, if the originally prescribed ad-
ministrative directions were followed." The change of cir-
cumstances must adversely affect the trust property.9 Since
no principles have been developed which would aid a peti-
tioner seeking authorization of a sale to determine what con-
stitutes "defeat or substantial impairment," the factual situ-
ation in each case must be drawn upon to give content to
those terms.
A third requirement dictates that the settlor must not
have anticipated the change of conditions. 0 This require-
ment grows out of the notion that the court, in altering the
administrative directions, is permitting the trustee to do
that which the settlor would have authorized had he fore-
seen the change in conditions which in fact came about. If
the settlor did anticipate the change, the express prohibition
of the instrument must be read as forbidding sale despite
the altered conditions, and judicial authorization of a sale
would be unjustified.".
8. Hicks Memorial Ass'n v. Lock, 178 Ark. 892, 12 S. W.2d
866 (1929) (no change of conditions found); Industrial Trust
v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 69 R. I. 317, 33 A.2d 167
(1943) (no impairment of trust by retention of property found).
See cases cited note 6 supra as illustrative of findings of impairment
and change of conditions.
9. Cary v. Cary, 309 Ill. 330, 141 N. E. 156 (1923); Weakly v.
Barrow, 137 Tenn. 224, 192 S. W. 927 (1916). Compare Johns v.
Johns, 172 Ill. 472, 50 N. E. 337 (1898), with Johns v. Montgomery,
265 Ill. 21, 106 N. E. 497 (1914). (These cases dealt with the same
trust property. In the first case the court refused a sale where the
only showing was a change as to the beneficiaries, while in the second
case sale was permitted because the change finally affected the prop-
erty.) Another view has stated that the changed circumstances must
affect the beneficiaries' interests as well as the trust property. See
Note, 77 A. L. R. 971 (1932). Reliance on this view precluded a sale
in Schramm v. United States National Bank, 151 Ore. 693, 52 P.2d
181 (1935).
10. 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 167, 190.4; 3 id. § 381; RESTATEMENT,
TRuSTS §§ 167, 190, 381.
11. Lovelace v. Marion Institute, 215 Ala. 271, 110 So. 381 (1926).
See 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS 842; Scott, Deviation from the Terms of a Trust,
44 HARV. L. REv. 1025, 1039 (1931). The trust instrument may mani-
fest the settlor's anticipation of changing conditions by the inclusion
of a provision which permits the continuance of the trust "so long as"
the trustees retain the property for the prescribed trust purposes, with
a reverter or valid gift over in the event the property ceases so to be
retained. First Cong. Soc. v. Bridgeport, 99 Conn. 22, 121 Atl. 77
(1923) (sale otherwise justifiable refused because of reverter pro-
vision) ; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 399, comments b and 1 (1935). But
cf. State v. Fed. Square Corp., 89 N. H. 538, 3 A.2d 109 (1938) (re-
verter provision held ineffective to prevent forced sale through exer-
cise of power of eminent domain); In re Y. W. C. A., 96 N. J. Eq.
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Finally, there is the rather obvious requirement that the
sale of the trust property must be in furtherance of the
trust purpose.12  Only that amount of alienation necessary
to preserve or accomplish the trust purpose will be allowed.' 3
Although no case has been found in which he was required to
show that the requested sale was the most expedient remedy,
a petitioner might wisely be prepared to prove that, if other
remedies do exist, sale of the property in question is the
remedy best calculated to' save the trust purpose from im-
pairment.14
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
TEST OF CAUSATION BETWEEN EMPLOYMENT
AND INJURY
A powder plant employee was killed by lightning while
proceeding to shelter pursuant to his employer's instructions.
In a proceeding for workmen's compensation, experts gave
conflicting testimony regarding whether the employee was
more exposed to lightning than others in the same locality
who were not engaged in the same pursuit. The Indiana
Appellate Court affirmed an award of compensation. It held
that since the employee would not have been at the place
where the lightning struck at the time it struck except for
his employment, there was sufficient causative connection
between the employment and the death by lightning.' On
transfer to the Supreme Court the award was affirmed, but
on a different ground. The Supreme Court held that the
employment "caused" the death, since the Industrial Board
could properly find from the evidence that the employee's
568, 126 Atl. 610 (1924). On the advisability of using conditions
precedent and subsequent as a means for discouraging sale see Scobey
v. Beckman, 111 Ind. App. 574, 41 N. E.2d 847 (1942); 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS
§ 401.2.
12. O'Hara v. Grand Lodge, 213 Cal. 131, 2 P.2d 21 (1931); Se-
curity-First National Bank v. Easter, 136 Cal. App. 691, 29 P.2d 422
(1934). See note 5 supra.
13. Johns v. Montgomery, 265 Ill. 21, 106 N. E. 497 (1914);
Weakly v. Barrow, 137 Tenn. 224, 192 S. W. 927 (1916).
14. But in Gilman v. Hamilton, 16 Il. 225 (1854), the existence
of a better remedy moved the court to refuse to apply the doctrine of
cy pres in authorization of sale.
1. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours Co. v. Lilly, 75 N. E.2d 796 (Ind.
App. 1947).
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